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I. Introduction
The first attempt at European economic reconstruction after 1945
culminated in the economic crisis of 1947 (Tumlir, La Haye 1981).
Due to state control over prices and production and the lack of
sound money for both internal and external transactions, Europe
had, to a large extent, returned to the stage of barter trade.
This paper addresses the strategies chosen to overcome the short-
age of international liquidity, the so-called "dollar gap", during
the second and successful attempt at European economic reconstruc-
tion from 1947 onwards. It focuses on those aspects which relate
directly to the transition from bilateral barter to multilateral
trade involving money, i.e. on the liberalisation of trade and
payments. Since most early steps to remove restrictions on exter-
nal trade and payments in Germany and Europe were initiated by the
U.S. and implemented on a Western European level, this paper dis-
cusses these first measures in a European context before the em-
phasis shifts to the question why West Germany became a genuine
pacemaker for the liberalisation of cross-border transactions from
1953 onwards. As a first step towards a more ambitious study, this
paper provides an - admittedly theory-laden - description of some
major aspects of the chosen subject rather than an in-depth theo-
retical analysis or a thorough evaluation of all historical evi-
dence available.
II. Strategic Choices
In the first two years after the war almost all European economies
were subjected to plans and regulated prices, and the importance
of money prices as indicators of relative scarcities and the role
of money itself as a safe store of value were further diminished
by open inflation in countries like France and "repressed inflati-
on" (i.e. fixed prices in a state of excess liquidity) in other
areas like occupied Germany. Cross-border transactions in Europe
and elsewhere were severely hampered by the lack of international
liquidity. The emergence of this "dollar gap" can be explained as- 2 -
follows: Any money - for exchanges within and between countries -
has to be based on the trust in the future acceptance of this mon-
ey by one's future partners in exchange. After the war only the
dollar played this role for international transactions at the ex-
isting exchange rates. Trade and payments figures (and the fash-
ionable "dollar shortage" talk which usually did not even address
the question of price, i.e. of the exchange rate) point to a gross,
undervaluation of the dollar in the postwar period. At the going
exchange rate, no other major currency looked sound enough to be
trustworthy or even be credited with some expected revaluation.
Consequently, every country had an incentive to refuse to accept
any currency but dollars in exchange for its goods. Due to a se-
vere shortage of money that could be used in transactions between
currency areas, the world outside the dollar area turned to barter
trade, i.e. a network of bilateral agreements specifying in detail
the quantities and values of goods to be exchanged in order to
make sure that no partner ended up with any deficit that would
have had to be settled in scarce dollars , or at least with no
bilateral deficit exceeding a fixed limit called "swing".
Bilateral agreements of this kind do not necessarily impede the
growth of trade volumes in the beginning. They may even facilitate
the abolition of protectionist measures. Any exporter whose sales
are actually restricted by a foreign country's quota can easily
identify which import controls of his own country would have to be
relaxed in order to pave the way for a balancing of bilateral
trade on a higher level. Thus, exporters can effectively lobby for
import liberalisation. However, these bilateral agreements distort
trade flows, hinder a specialisation according to comparative ad-
vantages, and impede a truly multilateral system of exchange.
Besides the countries of the dollar area, occupied Germany was a
major exception to the rule of bilateral trade, at least until
1948. At the end of the war the Allies had assumed complete con-
2 trol of cross-border contacts and exchanges . The Anglo-American
decrees (notably Joint Export Import Agency - JEIA - No. 1, 1947)
according to which the trade of the two major Western zones of- 3 -
occupation was to be conducted in dollars had two major conse-
quences: while Germany's customers discriminated against her ex-
ports, the terms of trade for the very tiny volume of Germany's
imports and exports looked rather favourable (Tables 2, 7).
In the first years after the war, the Americans in effect dealt
with the transatlantic payments imbalance by providing aid to pre-
vent "unrest and diseases" in Europe. Meanwhile, they used the
leverage that this aid gave them over European countries to pursue
the idea of an international economic order. This order was sup-
posed to be characterised by liberal trade practices on a non-dis-
criminatory basis (to be supervised by the envisaged International
Trade Organisation), some credit facilities for countries in the
process of reconstruction (World Bank), and stable exchange rates
(International Monetary Fund). But the organisations which were
actually established from 1944 onwards were - at least at that
time - far too weak to deal with any major problem. In face of the
ongoing American protectionism and of the actual state of disinte-
gration of the world economy due to the shortage of liquidity,
this American approach might - in very drastic words - be called a
strategy of "benign reluctance" to face the fundamental problems
of the time.
The crisis of 1947 in Europe marked the end of the first attempt
at European economic reconstruction after the war. Disruptions in
production due to the lack of energy (mainly coal), widespread
hunger attributed to a bad harvest which was caused by a hard win-
ter and a lack of fertilizers, and a host of other problems point-
ed to the major defect of the approach chosen so far: the lack of
a mechanism providing for an efficient allocation of resources.
The crisis of 1947 was a crisis of the means necessary for the
coordination of a complex pattern of division of labour rather
than a genuine crisis of production. Regulated relative prices had
failed i.a. to indicate a shortage of equipment for the transport
of goods (most of all coal), and the lack of sound money had in-
hibited the chance to allocate essential commodities between
places and uses according to relative scarcity.- 4 -
Shocked by the crisis and scared that parts of Western Europe
might become communist (or at least not be of much help in an
eventual conflict with the Soviet Union) and amidst fierce debates
within the American administration about the appropriate course of
action, the U.S., the only country capable of shaping the interna-
tional economic order, turned towards an increased involvement in
economic decision-making in Europe and decided to focus on the
abolit
1981) .
abolition of the bilateral trading practices (Tumlir, La Haye
In principle, the problem of the "dollar gap" underlying the bi-
lateral trading practices could have been dealt with in any of the
following ways, at least for some time:
(1) by more aid;
(2) by severe restrictions on currency movements involving dollars
(currency inconvertibility) and on transactions that give rise to
currency movements (import quotas, discrimination against dollar
imports in general);
(3) by a revaluation of the dollar in terms of gold or a corre-
sponding devaluation of most other currencies in terms of dollars;
(4) by relative disinflation in Europe; or
(5) by a worldwide change in preferences away from dollar imports.
With the announcement of the "Marshall Plan" in 1947 - which turn-
ed into the European Recovery Program (ERP) - and with the found-
ation of the Organisation for European Economic Co-Operation
(OEEC) in 1948 (in which the three Western zones of Germany were
initially represented by the Allied Authorities) the Americans
made their choice plain. They opted for (i) maintaining the severe
restrictions on transatlantic exchanges, (ii) providing Europe
with aid financed imports of capital goods and with some liquidity
necessary for the conduct of intra-European trade on a multilater-
al basis, i.e. without the need to balance trade bilaterally, and
(iii) pushing for the removal of restrictions on intra-European
exchanges. In effect, the U.S. decided to wait for a change in the
structure of European import demand away from dollar imports and
to "close" the dollar gap provisionally by more aid and a— 5 —
continuation of administrative controls for the time being. This
U.S. approach was in general supported by European governments who
favoured an increase in American aid over a devaluation of their
currencies, which would have raised the price of the socially sen-
sitive agricultural imports from the U.S. From this perspective,
American efforts to liberalise intra-European trade and to re-
integrate West Germany into the European economy can be seen,
apart from their political significance, as an attempt to speed up
the change in the structure of European import demand away from
dollar imports. Such a change did actually occur to some extent in
the 1950s as the increased agricultural output in Europe, the sup-
ply of high quality capital goods by Germany, and the general pro-
gress of European reconstruction did reduce the postwar dependence
on imports from the U.S..
It is remarkable that the U.S. did use the leverage they had over
Western Europe to promote European economic integration instead
of, say, a far-reaching liberalisation of dollar imports or a
thorough currency realignment. However, at the going exchange
rates the U.S. would have had to pay the bill for increased Euro-
pean dollar imports by extending more aid, and a revaluation of
the dollar would at least in some respects have had the same con-
sequences as the chosen path of maintaining trade restrictions: it
would have hurt American exports. Obviously, at least as far as
international trade and payments were concerned, the U.S. and Eu-
rope in the late 1940s still preferred a state rationing of quan-
tities at artificial prices to a rationing via the price mechan-
ism. Although a currency realignment would also have reduced the
scope for the growth of American exports, as least for the time
being, it remains an odd feature of postwar economic policy that
the U.S. actually did pay Europe to erect a trade system based on
the continuing discrimination against dollar imports.
Incidentally, American pressure to liberalise intra-European trade
and payments eventually initiated a step in the right direction.
Faced with (i) OEEC demands for an increasing element of multilat-
eralism in the settlement of payments balances in Europe (Erhard- 6 -
1954) during a time when the British foreign exchange position was
deteriorating rapidly and (ii) with American-inspired discussions
in the IMF over a (mild) devaluation of Sterling, the British de-
valued their currency by 30.5 % in mid-September 1949. This move
led to a wave of devaluations against the dollar throughout the
world. Some European countries like the Netherlands exactly copied
the British example, other countries devalued their currencies by
a smaller percentage (20.6 % in the case of Germany) while Swit-
zerland and a few others kept their dollar exchange rates stable.
Although some high inflation countries in Europe actually devalued
their currencies vis-a-vis the dollar more than once, these
changes in parities were not sufficient to close the "dollar gap".
However, they did reduce the potential scope for intra-European
payments imbalances and thus facilitated moves towards regional
multilateralism. These moves began in earnest with the decision of
the OEEC-countries in late 1949 to remove quantitative restric-
tions on 50 per cent of intra-European trade as of December 15,
1949, and with the initiation of talks on a European Payments
Union in the same month (Triffin 1957).
III. The Role of the European Payments Union
A. The Clearing Mechanism
The European Payments Union (EPU), which replaced the first timid
4
attempts to introduce regional multilateralism in Europe in mid-
1950, was to a large extent the brainchild of the U.S. Economic
Cooperation Agency (ECA). Having won a fierce debate with the U.S.
Treasury, which had advocated a strengthening of the IMF (Triffin
1957, p. 136), the ECA initiated negotiations over a regional mul-
tilateral clearing mechanism in Europe. As a supplement to the
OEEC which applied pressure on European countries to liberalise
intra-European trade, the EPU was designed to advance European
economic integration in two ways: (i) under the EPU regime, all- 7 -
intra-EPU payments were to be settled monthly on a strictly multi-
lateral basis, thus reducing the overall need for transaction bal-
ances in transferable currencies (i.e., the dollar) and eliminat-
ing any need for a bilateral balancing of trade in the area cov-
ered by the EPU; (ii) the EPU was to provide for the automatic
extension of limited balance of payments credits from countries
with net surpluses in intra-EPU exchanges to net debtors, with the
credits being backed up by an initial infusion of $350 million of
ERP-aid. In the EPU agreement, which was signed on September 19,
1950 and covered intra-EPU payments from July 1, 1950 onwards, the
contracting parties specified the details of this credit mechanism
in the following way: every member country was allotted a quota
amounting to roughly 15 % of its 1949 trade volume with OEEC mem-
bers. Within the limits set by these quotas 60 % of net deficits
or surpluses with the Union were to be settled by the extension of
credit and 40 % in gold or dollars . In case the net cumulative
deficit of a country surpassed its quota, the difference had to be
settled entirely in gold .
The EPU was more than a merely intra-European organisation. The
clearing mechanism encompassed European payments balances with the
entire monetary areas of the OEEC countries, including overseas
territories and all members of the sterling area such as India,
Pakistan, and South Africa. All in all, the EPU area accounted for
57.4 % of world exports and for 61.7 % of world imports in 1950.
The actual clearing operations were carried out by the Bank for
International Settlements in Basle, while the administration of
the EPU was laid into the hands of a Paris-based managing board
operating under the supervision of the OEEC Council, which in turn
had the exclusive authority to take all major decisions.
B. The "German Crisis"
Viewed from a German perspective, the European Payments Union
seemed to be set for a good start. In June 1950, the last month
not covered by the EPU, the balance of payments problems following— ft —
the 1949 realignment of currencies and the subsequent removal of
quantitative restrictions affecting roughly 50 % of private im-
ports from OEEC countries in late 1949 , had been all but over-
come. The overall trade deficit had narrowed to $45 million in
June, with exports rising rapidly (63 % up on the monthly average
of the second quarter of 1949, Table 5, Table 6) while imports
stagnated. Vis-a-vis the EPU countries, the monthly trade deficit
was down to $7 million. These figures may explain why the German
balance of payments crisis that developed in the first month of
the Korea-boom took the German authorities and the EPU management
by surprise. By the end of September 1950, i.e. within three
months of regional multilateral clearing via EPU and before the
EPU directorate had even met for the first time, West Germany had
exhausted almost 60 % of her quota, while all other member coun-
tries (or currency areas, respectively) exhibited hardly any defi-
cit at all (Denmark came a distant second with a deficit of some
10 % of her quota). The deterioration of the German EPU position
accelerated in October. Following the implementation of the OEEC
decision to raise the percentage of "liberalised" private imports
from OEEC countries to 60 % in early October (with the emphasis on
raw material imports), the German monthly trade deficit with the
EPU area went up to a record $71 million. This development was
mostly due to the run on raw materials from overseas and to pur-
chases of consumer goods from the metropolitan EPU area (member
countries excluding their overseas territorities). To combat this
surge in imports, the German inter-ministerial import committee
("EinfuhrausschuB") and the central bank undertook i.a. the fol-
lowing actions in the second half of October 1950: outstanding
import licences, for which contracts had not been signed, were
cancelled (Wallich 1955, p. 236); applicants for new licences were
obliged to deposit 50 % of the value of the desired imports until
the goods had actually entered the country (25 % as of December
23); banks were subjected to a host of measures including outright
credit restrictions and an increase in minimum deposit require-
ments with the central bank by 50 % (on average for the various
categories of bank liabilities); and the discount rate was raised
from 4 to 6 % (BIS 1951, p. 50f). The main emphasis of these- 9 -
actions was to dampen the growth of internal demand and, thus, im-
ports. Trying to build up a reputation as a liberal trader and
trustworthy member of the OEEC, West Germany was eager to avoid
the reimposition of quotas on previously liberalised imports. The
exchange rate was not altered although the Advisory Council to the
ministry of economic affairs had strongly advocated a devaluation
(Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, 5.11.1950).
The discussion of the German crisis by the EPU directorate and the
OEEC council was based on the report of two independent experts,
Alec Cairncross and Per Jacobsson, who, having scrutinised the
West German economy, came up with the conclusion that the patient
was basically healthy (Cairncross and Jacobsson 1950) . On November
14, when Germany's cumulative deficit had already surpassed her
quota, the OEEC council decided to extend a special credit of $120
million designed to cover up to two-thirds of the German EPU defi-
cit in the months until April 1951, provided the West German gov-
ernment submitted a credible program for the restoration of exter-
nal balance. This condition was formally met by the German govern-
ment in early December, although the parliamentary debate on tax
increases, the core of the proposed measures, did not start prior
to March 1951 (BIS 1951, p. 50ff) .
Meanwhile, the October measures did show some effect. The trade
deficit with the EPU area went down to an average of $40 million
for the months of November to February. However, even a reduced
deficit still implied a deterioration of the German cumulative
balance with the EPU. At the end of January 1951 the "Bank deut-
scher Lander" enacted new credit restrictions, and on February 22,
when the German cumulative balance with EPU surpassed a deficit of
$450 million, the import committee suspended the previous relaxa-
tion of quantitative controls and temporarily ceased to issue new
import licences six days later. In spite of grumblings about a
German return to "Schachtian" trade practices in some Western Eu-
ropean countries (Erhard 1954), the EPU directorate accepted the
German measures, thus barring other member states from retaliating
against German exports. In the following months, the German- 10 -
overall balance of trade (Table 5) and her EPU position improved
dramatically, with Germany repaying the special assistance credit
in May - five months ahead of schedule - and turning into a net
creditor to the EPU by November 1951, a position the country con-
tinued to hold until the EPU was abolished in late 1958. In com-
pliance with requests, by the EPU directorate and under the super-
vision of a mediation group of three independent experts appointed
by the OEEC council, the "EinfuhrausschuB" had gradually resumed
issuing new import licences since spring 1951, though quantitative
restrictions were not lifted prior to January 1952 (for 57 % of
private OEEC imports, a share that increased to 76 % in April and
to 81 % in August 1952).
The speed of improvement in the West German payments position
gives rise to the question how severe the crisis had actually been
in the first place. For a thorough evaluation the following points
have to be considered.
(i) The run on imports, especially on raw materials, initiated by
the war in Korea had led to a substantial worsening of Ger-
many' s terms of trade - on top of the already severe deterio-
ration in the wake of the currency realignment in late 1949
(Table 7). The OEEC price index for raw materials reached its
peak in the first quarter of 1951, just at the time when Ger-
many suspended liberalisation (Table 7). With Soviet troops
located on her eastern border, hoarding of raw materials (and
consumer goods) was more pronounced in West Germany than else-
where. However, the accumulation of stocks would not have gone
on indefinitely, while higher import prices were bound to
dampen import demand anyhow, although with a J-curve type de-
lay.
(ii) The terms of payments for West Germany's foreign trade had
changed for the worse. Germany's customers delayed payments
for exports, while imports had to be paid for immediately.
According to the Bank for International Settlement this change
alone accounted for a shortfall of foreign exchange receipts- 11 -
of $65 million vis-a"-vis the EPU area in the second half of
1950 (BIS 1951, p. 48). However, payments were not likely to
be delayed indefinitely unless war did actually break out in
Europe, and the "Bank deutscher Lander" had already taken an
important step to halt this hidden flight of capital by rais-
ing interest rates in October 1950. In the first half of 1951
the terms of payments for Germany's foreign trade normalised.
(iii) Prior to the Korea-boom capacity utilisation in West Germany
had been lower than in other industrial countries. Consequent-
ly, West Germany had more scope for the expansion of produc-
tion which by necessity implied a surge in raw material im-
ports in advance of any substantial increase in production for
internal and external markets. At least some imported raw ma-
terials were likely to find their way into export products
eventually.
(iv) Even the notion that imports were expanding ahead of exports
does not hold without some qualifications. Germany's overall
trade deficit in 1950 ($60 million/month on average) was actu-
ally smaller than the 1949 deficit ($93 million respectively).
If imports had remained at their October 1950 level (or even
if they had been higher by, say, $30 million/month) for the
rest of the year, the West German balance of trade would still
have shown a remarkable improvement over the year 1949 (the
same holds for a comparison of the corresponding quarters of
these years, Table 5) .
(v) Except for January 1950, a month in which imports were ex-
tremely high due to the removal of quantitative restrictions
on roughly 50 % of private imports from the OEEC area, exports
had been rising much more rapidly than imports in terms of
their annual percentage change throughout 1950 and 1951 (Table
6). As exports grew from a lower level, this discrepancy of
growth rates in favour of exports could go along with a tempo-
rary balance of trade deterioration in late 1950 - an imbal-
ance that would soon have corrected itself, provided that no- 12 -
major change of trend had occurred. The development of export
and import volumes confirms this optimistic view. In the
fourth quarter of 1950 imports (in constant prices) were up
33.5 % on the last quarter of the preceding year, while export
volumes had grown by 142 %.
(vi) The most striking feature of German trade in 1950 was the
change in the breakdown of imports by regions of origin. In
1949, 45 % of German imports had come from countries that were
to become part of the EPU area, 38 % from North America. Due
to
- the drastic decline of imports financed by U.S. aid (from
$96 million/month in 1949 to $40 million/month in 1950),
- the intra-European liberalisation measures of late 1949 and
mid-1950, and
- the chance to increase raw material imports from the non-
metropolitan EPU countries,
the share of imports originating in the EPU areas went up by
13 percentage points to 68 %, while the share of imports from
the U.S. and Canada declined correspondingly (Table 1). Almost
the reverse happened to West German exports: the share of ex-
ports to the EPU area went down by 8 percentage points to 77 %
in 1950 (which can be seen as part of a normalisation process
as the percentage of exports going to the currency areas of
Western European countries had been extremely high in the
post-war years). This redirection of trade and the delay in
payments for exports mentioned above account to a large extent
for the rapid exhaustion of the West German EPU quota at the
time of an export boom.
All in all, the changes in the West German balance of payments in
late 1950 and early 1951 hardly deserve the label "German crisis".
While the restrictions on the expansion of internal credit may
have been justified to check the rise of prices during the Korea-
boom, the suspension of import liberalisation was certainly not
justified by the actual development of trade. However, this criti-
cism can hardly be directed at the German authorities, whoseBibliothek
- 13 - des Instituts fur Weltwirtschaff
foreign exchange reserves were running out. Rather, it points to a
deficiency of the international payments system apart from the
fact that exchange rates were fixed, namely to the lack of an ade-
quate source of credit on commercial terms for a rapidly and
healthily growing country. The EPU quota, based on 1949 trade fig-
ures which had been rather small for West Germany, was certainly
not sufficient. Acknowledging this fact, the EPU raised the German
quota to $500 million in late 1951. Still then, the lack of an
international capital market remained a potential obstacle to
growth.
C. Stages of Liberalisation
In spite of the German deliberalisation in early 1951, the han-
dling of the German crisis and the rapid improvement in the German
payments position in the same year thoroughly enhanced the pres-
tige of the EPU and the OEEC. The measures adopted by Germany and
the EPU set a precedent for other crises to come. By means of (i)
extending temporary balance of payments credits and (ii) by making
sure that no member country could legally retaliate against a
country whose import deliberalisation the EPU had deemed temporar-
ily justified, the EPU and the OEEC council enticed those debtor
countries about to exceed their quotas to adopt more restrictive
monetary and fiscal policies and to relax any reimposed import
control within a short period of time. The negotiations over the
terms of renewal of the EPU, that were held every year since the
initial agreement on each country's financial obligations to the
EPU had expired in 1952, endowed creditor countries with some le-
verage over net debtors who were afraid of losing a convenient
source of credit. Creditors effectively used this leverage to
nudge debtors towards a more liberal trade and payments regime. On
the other hand, countries accumulating claims on the union in ex-
cess of their quotas were themselves urged by the EPU to further
liberalise their imports.
Roughly speaking, the abolition of impediments to trade and pay-
ments proceeded in the following stages:- 14 -
(1) Initially, the emphasis lay on liberalisation in the narrowest
sense, i.e. the removal of quantitative restrictions on trade
in goods. In July 1950, even before the EPU agreement had been
worked out in detail, the OEEC countries agreed to raise their
percentage of OEEC imports free from quotas to 60 % as of Oc-
tober 4, 1950 for each of the broad categories of goods (food
and feeding stuffs, raw materials, and manufactured goods) and
to increase the share of these liberalised goods in their to-
tal private imports from the OEEC area to 75 % on average for
the various categories of commodities as of February 1, 1951.
On January 14, 1955, this overall percentage was further in-
creased to 90 % (EPU 1951, 1955; BIS 1955). While member coun-
tries had initially been free to choose the goods they wanted
to liberalise within the three categories of goods, the OEEC
eventually passed a "common list" as a minimum requirement for
all members as of August 15, 1951. The removal of quotas on
imports originating in non-OEEC countries covered by the EPU
(i.e. countries belonging to a member's currency area) and in
other countries outside the dollar area lagged slightly behind
the liberalisation of intra-OEEC trade, while the first sub-
stantial steps towards freeing dollar imports were taken by
the United Kingdom and West Germany in early 1954, a move
which most other members imitated in late 1954 and early 1955.
(2) In the years 1953-55 the emphasis shifted somewhat to invisi-
ble trade. Following some initial steps dating back to the
years since 1950, the OEEC decided in June 1955 that, subject
to some limitations and escape clauses, all invisible transac-
tions and transfers on current account between OEEC members
should be free of restrictions (EPU 1956, p. 27). However,
liberalisation of invisible trade did not imply free competi-
tion between suppliers of services in Western Europe. It mere-
ly meant that expenditures for and incomes arising from cross
border transactions in services became convertible into the
desired European currency.
(3) In the same period (1953-55), member countries made remarkable15 -
progress on their way to full convertibility of currencies. In
May 1953, authorised banks in eight major member countries
were permitted to set up multilateral arbitrage arrangements
for spot (and later for forward) transactions in any of the
eight currencies involved. In early 1954, the United Kingdom,
still hoping to reestablish sterling as a widely accepted
world currency, took the lead in extending convertibility for
her currency beyond the EPU area to (almost) every country
outside the dollar area, an example that was followed by Ger-
many in late 1954 ("Beko-Mark") and by most other OEEC coun-
tries in the following year. Furthermore, at the insistence of
countries with mounting cumulative surpluses, above all Bel-
gium and West Germany, the terms of deficit and surplus set-
tlement were "hardened". On June 30, 1954, the initial gold-
free tranche for debtors was abolished and 13 months later the
share of gold (or dollars) in any future settlement was in-
creased to 75 %. The importance of these moves towards a high-
er degree of convertibility was, however, diminished by cor-
responding increases in all quotas which made sure that the
maximum amount of automatic and - in fact - permanent credit
available still amounted to 60 % of the original quota. Given
the fact that prior to these changes deficits in excess of the
quota had to be settled in gold anyhow unless the OEEC council
had granted special assistance credits, the net effect of this
"hardening" was felt only by countries who had not already
exhausted their original quotas. Unlike these changes in pay-
ments provisions and quotas there was another agreement con-
cluded in mid-1955 which turned out to be of considerable im-
portance, -although with a long delay: after protracted negoti-
ations between debtor and creditor countries, the OEEC members
agreed to terminate the EPU as soon as members holding more
than 50 % of the quotas had made their currencies fully con-
vertible into dollars. According to this European Monetary
Agreement signed on August 5, 1955, a European fund was to
become the new provider of temporary balance of payments cred-
it in Europe (besides the IMF who played an increasingly ac-
tive role in Europe in the 2nd half of the 50s). However, due- 16 -
to a series of balance of payments crises from mid-1955 on-
wards, it took three-and-a-half years until member countries
holding a majority of EPU quotas finally agreed to replace the
EPU with the European Monetary Agreement as of December 27,
1958.
All in all, the liberalisation of trade and payments followed a
peculiar pattern. Most major steps on the European level, i.e. the
removal of 50 % of existing quotas in late 1949, the raising of
this percentage to 75 % and the introduction of the EPU, both
agreed upon in mid-1950, the measures undertaken in the years
1953-54, and finally the restoration of full currency convertibil-
ity for non-resident holders at the end of 1958, were initiated -
though not always enacted - in times of comparatively slow growth
of output and trade or in the initial phases of an upswing (the
1955 measures being the exception to the rule). This runs counter
to the belief that liberalisation is easiest in times of rapid
growth. The reason for this specific feature seems to be that in
the 1950s the attainment of balance of payments equilibrium at a
given exchange rate was closer to the heart of European policy-
makers than outright protectionism. Given a system in which ex-
change rates are fixed, existing imbalances tend to get worse in
times of rapid growth of both imports and exports, while they
abate in times of relative stagnation. Furthermore, imports react-
ed more strongly than exports to changes in the relation between
o
aggregate demand and supply , making it easier for deficit coun-
tries to consent to a further liberalisation of imports in times
of comparatively slow growth. In times of most rapid growth and in
the immediate post-peak phase of cyclical booms, i.e. from late
1950 to the end of 1951 and from mid-1954 to mid-1957, the EPU
tried to hold the line, offering assistance to extreme debtors in
exchange for promises to act on internal demand rather than to
restrict imports, while urging creditor countries to relax remain-
ing impediments to the free flow of trade and payments for current
account transactions.- 17 -
A simple rule of thumb goes a long way towards explaining why
which members tended to get into what kind of serious imbalance
during upswings. Low inflation countries usually accumulated huge
claims on the union while high inflation countries tended to suf-
fer from recurrent balance of payments crises. Evidence presented
in Table 9 suggests that the divergences in the development of
major member countries' cumulative balances with the EPU can, at
least to some extent, be attributed to inflation rate differen-
tials (with Switzerland, a country which had not devalued her cur-
rency in late 1949, being the major exception to the rule).
From late 1955 onwards the EPU turned into an almost bilateral
affair, with low inflation Germany accumulating high surpluses in
excess of her quota (accommodated for by quota extensions called
"rallonges"), forfeiting dollar payments she would have been en-
titled to receive from the union, and extending credit via the
EPU-mechanism to high inflation France, whose position with the
EPU deteriorated rapidly. This increasing imbalance was bound to
bring down the EPU eventually. In late 1958, following a cyclical
downswing and the drastic change in'French policies (de Gaulle's
rise to power, two devaluations in 1957 and 1958, and the adoption
of an austerity program called "plan Rueff" approved by the OEEC
and the IMF), France finally agreed to replace the EPU with the
European monetary agreement as of December 27, 1958. With the ex-
ception of Greece (who followed in May 1959), Iceland, and Turkey,
all OEEC members restored external convertibility for non-resident
holders of their currencies on this date.
D. Evaluation
The European Payments Union was meant to close the "dollar gap"
and to enhance economic growth in Europe by distorting the pattern
of trade flows in favour of intra-European exchanges for a limited
period of time. It is remarkable that this European discrimination
against dollar imports was actually not perpetuated but gradually
reduced, and that the EPU itself was dissolved in late 1958 to be
replaced by a more liberal regime. Although the transition to full- 18 -
convertibility took considerably longer than anticipated in 1950,
the fact that it actually happened has to be counted as a success.
In terms of the objectives laid down in the Preamble to the EPU
Agreement in 1950 (EPU 1950, 1959), i.e. (i) the removal of quan-
titative restrictions on the basis of non-discrimination in Eu-
rope, (ii) further moves towards full convertibility, (iii) in-
creases in foreign exchange reserves, and (iv) the attainment of
independence from U.S. aid, the EPU members made remarkable pro-
gress during the years in which the EPU operated.
In terms of "trade creation", the EPU seems to have been a success
as well, at least at first glance. The shares of the metropolitan
EPU countries in both world imports and world exports rose signif-
icantly in the years 1950-58, from 35.3 to 41.8 % for exports and
from 41.8 to 43.6 % for imports respectively (Table 4). These fig-
ures point to a considerable reduction of the combined trade defi-
cit of the metropolitan OEEC countries and to a rapid increase in
trade at the same time. However, this growth of shares in world
trade can be attributed to one single factor: the re-emergence of
West Germany. The Federal Republic took 4.6 % of world imports in
1950 compared to 7.5 % eight years later and increased her exports
from 3.6 to 9.4 % of world exports at the same time, almost at-
taining the shares held by the much larger German Reich in 1937
(8.2 % for imports and 9.8 % for exports respectively, Table 4).
The other metropolitan OEEC countries barely increased their slice
of world exports (32.6 % in 1958 as opposed to 31.7 % in 1950 and
32.6 % in 1937), while their share of world imports declined from
37.1 % to 36.2 % (1937: 43.8 %). Although the EPU may initially
have facilitated the German re-integration into the world trading
system and may have given the Germans the chance to promote their
trade by extending export credits to France and others via the EPU
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mechanism, the comparison with other EPU members shows that this
institution can hardly be credited with the German success.
Another way of looking at the effects of the EPU is to examine the
change in the breakdown of trade flows by regions. The standard
theory of customs unions suggests that both "trade creation" and- 19 -
"trade diversion" would lead to an increase in internal trade rel-
ative to external trade in any (regional) grouping that lowers its
trade barriers for members more than it does for outsiders, thus
discriminating against the latter. Neglecting Germany for the mo-
ment, the experience of the other metropolitan OEEC countries fits
into this picture (see Table 8). For these countries the share of
imports coming from metropolitan OEEC countries went up from 35.2
% in 1949 to 39.3 % the following year and reached 46.4 % in 1958
(1937: 37.7 %). The rise in the corresponding export share was
less pronounced, it went up from 43.8 % (1949) to 47.2 % (1950)
and to an average of 48.5 % in the years 1955-58 (however, the
share was down to 47 % in 1958) . The relative importance of trade
(i) within monetary areas, (ii) with overseas regions covered by
the EPU mechanism in general, and (iii) with other developing
countries, notably in Latin America, decreased while exports to
the U.S. and Canada grew slightly faster than average, thus con-
tributing to the tendency towards balance in cross-Atlantic trade.
Data on the divergence of regional trade patterns between members
sheds another light on European economic integration from 1949-58.
Taking the share of intra-OEEC trade in overall trade as the rele-
vant indicator, it appears that the countries became slightly more
similar (once again neglecting Germany for the moment): the amount
by which individual countries deviated from the average decreased
in this period, for exports more so than for imports (see Table
8). This move towards more similar patterns of trade was most pro-
nounced in 1950, i.e. following the abolition of quotas on 50 % of
intra-OEEC trade.
Once again, West Germany was a special case in point. The figures
for Germany, although they do reveal a tendency of trade patterns
moving towards the OEEC average, do not indicate a growing rela-
tive importance of intra-European trade. A look at the striking
regional imbalance of German trade in the early post-war years
helps to explain this feature (see Table 1). In 1949, only one-
third of West German imports originated in the metropolitan OEEC
area (up from 21 % in 1947) , while 78 % of her exports went to- 20 -
these countries (1947: 95 %). These figures for the early post-war
years reflect i.a. the importance of aid-financed food imports
from the U.S. and of raw material exports to neighbouring European
countries. In 1950, the share of OEEC imports increased by 17 per-
centage points to 50 % (see chapter III. B.), significantly ex-
ceeding the OEEC average. During the following years, the share of
OEEC imports decreased by 43.7 % in 1958 (3.7 percentage points
below OEEC average), contradicting the development in other OEEC
countries. At the same time, Germany's regional trade pattern be-
came more balanced, with the share of exports to OEEC countries
declining to 68.9 % in 1950 and to 57.1 % in 1958 (5 percentage
points above the 19 37 figure for the German Reich). Corresponding-
ly, Germany increased her share of the North American market more
rapidly than the rest of the OEEC. With less inflation, a rela-
tively far-reaching and rapid liberalisation of imports and a fas-
ter growth of productivity than in most other EPU countries (OEEC
1955, p. 70; OEEC 1956, p. 26), Germany outpaced her OEEC partners
in terms of export and import growth and gained market shares
overseas while other European countries became slightly more de-
pendent on intra-European exchanges. Ropke's apprehension that the
EPU would severely distort Germany's traditional trade pattern,
i.e. surpluses with Europe compensating for deficits in overseas
trade (Ropke 1950), turned out to be overpessimistic. From 1951
onwards, Germany was once again running a surplus in intra-Euro-
pean trade while the trade balance with overseas countries exhi-
bited the traditional deficit (Table 1).
All in all, the evidence presented above is consistent with the
following hypotheses. The first steps towards freer trade in Eu-
rope, i.e. the removal of quotas in December 1949 and October 1950
and the founding of the EPU, significantly and lastingly enhanced
the economic integration of Europe, reducing the relative impor-
tance of (aid-financed) dollar imports and of exchanges within
monetary areas. For the following years in which the further lib-
eralisation of intra-European exchanges was paralleled by first
measures to remove quotas on imports from other regions, the evi-
dence reveals neither a major additional amount of trade creation- 21 -
within Europe nor increasing trade diversion to the detriment of
outsiders. It rather indicates some tendency towards an intra-
industry type of division of labour within Europe and across the
Atlantic, replacing trade with the (former) colonies in the south.
Thus, apart from the initial effects and as far as conclusions can
be drawn from trade data at this level of aggregation, the EPU can
neither be credited with trade creation on a grand scale nor can
she be blamed for massive trade diversion.
In order to come up with a well-founded judgement, the EPU has to
be compared with the likely effects of feasible alternatives. Via
the EPU, the U.S. did provide some international liquidity neces-
sary for the transition to regional multilateralism, and the EPU
facilities did offer incentives for the removal of barriers to
cross-border transactions. However, the same might have been
achievable with less initial discrimination against dollar imports
by a similar payments union including the dollar area, i.e. by a
reformed and more active IMF. It is at least conceivable that un-
der such a regime which would necessarily have focussed on the
transatlantic payments imbalance, the U.S. might have liberalised
their imports more rapidly, while the European countries might
have been under increased pressure to devalue their currencies.
Under the EPU regime, the U.S. and Europe waited until, at the end
of the reconstruction period in the mid-50s and with the re-emer-
gence of Germany as a major supplier of capital goods, Europe's
special post-war need to import from the dollar area had been re-
duced before Europe liberalised imports from the region which, at
least at that time, could offer the most advanced technology.
Unfortunately, the alternative option of flexible exchange rates
was not even seriously considered by most policy-makers in the
late 1940s and early 1950s . Milton Friedman first presented his
- by now famous - "Case for Flexible Exchange Rates" in a memoran-
dum written in late 1950 (Friedman 1953, p. 157). However, he did
not convince policy-makers and fellow economists for the time be-
ing that any shortage, be it the lack of a commodity or the lack
of international liquidity, would correct itself if the relative- 22 -
prices concerned were allowed to move freely according to relative
scarcities. Lower exchange rates vis-a-vis the dollar, be they
determined by the market or be they the result of a devaluation in
a regime of otherwise fixed parities (as the Advisory Council to
the German Ministry of Economic Affairs had advocated, Wissen-
schaftlicher Beirat 27.4.1952) would have made Europe attractive
for foreign investors. Provided that restrictions on the free flow
of capital had been relaxed accordingly, this inflow of capital
would have shortened the time needed for reconstruction and the
partial catching up with the U.S.. At the same time, a higher dol-
lar would have subjected the American economy to more competitive
pressure. Under such a regime, productivity could have increased
at an even more rapid rate on both sides of the Atlantic.
IV. Determinants of West Germany's Liberalisation Policy
A. Removal of Administrative Controls
In spite of the traditional importance of Germany's foreign sector
the development of trade on commercial terms lagged even behind
the initially sluggish reconstruction of West Germany's internal
economy in the post-war period. This can be attributed (i) to the
fact that foreign trade had become an Allied government monopoly
in 1945 (which was rather reluctantly and slowly dismantled from
August 1947 onwards), (ii) to the Allied decision that Germany's
trade had to be conducted in dollars at artificially high exchange
rates , and - most of all - (iii) to the lack of any appropriate
incentive to go beyond the export obligations imposed by the Al-
lies. Apart from a minor foreign exchange retention quota intro-
12 duced in Bizonia in September 1947 , German firms were paid in
almost useless Reichsmark for their exports while local markets
offered at least opportunities for profitable barter transactions.
Thus, the relaxation of internal price controls coupled with the
currency reform in June 1948, i.e. the re-introduction of sound
money for internal use, provided a significant stimulus to engage- 23 -
in international trade as well. However, foreign trade continued
to play a rather minor role for the time being as external trans-
actions were still tightly controlled by JEIA. This agency was
finally dissolved in October 1949.
West Germany's subsequent gradual progress towards less government
interference into external transactions to complement the internal
liberalisation of June 1948 roughly resembles the pattern describ-
ed above in Chapter III for the EPU members as a whole, the main
difference being that, from 1953 onwards, Germany undertook most
steps earlier than most other EPU members. For the period from
late 1949 to early 1953, liberalisation almost exclusively meant
the removal of quantitative restrictions on imports from the EPU
area and, with a slight delay, from other non-dollar countries.
The motives behind these early measures (including the reliberal-
isation after the "German Crisis") can be summarized as follows:
(i) Trying to become a respected member of the Western world, Ger-
many took great pains to comply with the rules conceived by the
ECA and laid down by the OEEC. (ii) The liberalisation was meant
to ensure reciprocal concessions from fellow OEEC members and -
with respect to countries that had entered into bilateral agree-
ments with Germany - to widen the scope for the growth of exports,
a scope given by the sum of German imports from the country con-
cerned and the respective swing credit, (iii) To enhance the
growth of output in general and of exports in particular, the re-
moval of quotas on imports of raw materials and other "essential"
goods not produced locally was given top priority, notably vis-a"-
vis countries outside the dollar area, (iv) And at least by some
economists like Ropke (1950) , integration into the world market
was - correctly - seen as a powerful tool to prevent a recarteli-
sation, an issue which in the early post-war years had dominated
the thinking of many Americans calling for a new and thoroughly
liberal Germany.
In the years after 1952, the reasons underlying the German liber-
alisation efforts changed. Policy-makers were faced with growing
trade and current account surpluses. The corresponding influx of- 24 -
foreign reserves endangered the policy of tight money as the Bun-
desbank could not go on buying foreign currencies and selling do-
mestic assets indefinitely to keep the money supply stable. Thus,
the desire to promote price level stability and to keep the inflow
of reserves in check by relaxing import restrictions became an
important determinant of Germany's trade and payments policy. As a
low inflation country piling up the largest cumulative surplus
relative to her quota within the EPU, Germany turned into a pace-
maker for European liberalisation, taking unilateral steps ahead
in times of cyclical upswings while some debtor countries tempo-
rarily re-introduced severe restrictions to trade at the same
time. The almost permanent pressure brought upon West Germany by
the OEEC helped to overcome internal resistance against these mea-
sures.
In the years 1955-57, amidst a swelling influx of reserves, Ger-
many tried to use the relaxation of administrative controls as a
substitute for a revaluation of her currency. In this sense, Ger-
many' s almost dogmatic adherence to the principle of fixed pari-
ties facilitated her integration into the world market. However,
the liberalisation of imports (and the gradual restoration of some
degree of freedom for capital outflows which had started in 1953
and continuously outpaced the removal of restrictions on capital
inflows) is no adequate substitute for a revaluation in the long
run. Even under a regime of fixed exchange rates, liberalisation
tends to promote export growth, directly by reducing the internal
price of imported raw materials and intermediate products and in-
directly by enhancing productivity growth and putting downward
pressure on wages, albeit with a delay. Thus, the cyclical down-
turn in the U.S. and in Europe in late 1957 and 1958, which re-
duced foreign demand for German exports, did more to relieve the
pressure on the German Mark than all measures directed at imports.
In the revaluation debate, the Advisory Council to the Ministry of
Economic Affairs strongly demanded a realignment of currencies,
albeit with a difference: the Council argued for a devaluation of
other European currencies rather than for a revaluation of the- 25 -
Mark (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, 30.4.1957). Trade figures support
the rationale behind this view: Germany was running a huge trade
surplus with Europe and a small deficit with the rest of the world
while the other OEEC countries combined exhibited massive deficits
both vis-a-vis Europe and the rest of the world. In August 1957,
France actually devalued her currency de facto by 20 %. This move
slightly eased the French balance-of-payments problems. However,
it was insufficient to arrest the deterioration in the French po-
sition with the EPU and to correct the fundamental imbalances in
intra-European trade.
The unwillingness of other European countries to devalue their
currencies and Germany's reluctance to revalue the Mark implied
that Germany had to maintain restrictions on capital inflows and
to accumulate unproductive foreign exchange surpluses at the same
time. She thus forfeited a chance for an even more efficient allo-
cation of resources.
However, this is not the only dark spot in German foreign economic
policy in the '50s. Up to this point, this paper has presented the
German liberalisation efforts as if they had hardly been affected
by any kind of protectionism. As a matter of fact, protectionist
pressure groups were quite active and, in some cases, remarkably
successful. While the freeing of raw material imports posed no
major obstacle, the removal of quotas on imports of foodstuffs
encountered fierce resistance from the influential agrarian lobby.
As most of the expected benefits from liberalisation (e.g., more
price level stability and less pressure on the German mark) did
not critically depend on the adoption of measures affecting all
kinds of imports in the same way, the German authorities yielded
to these pressures, although at least Ludwig Erhard, the Minister
of Economic Affairs, was aware of the distortions implied. As quo-
tas on imports of raw materials and most industrial goods were
abolished, the effective rate of protection for the non-liberalis-
ed goods increased. Table 3 shows that the liberalisation of
agrarian imports lagged behind consistently. However, Table 3 ac-
tually understates the extent of quantitative restrictions on food- 26 -
and feeding stuff imports. Even in the '50s, the markets of many
agrarian products were so tightly controlled by "orderly market
regimes" ("Marktordnungen") in Germany that trade in these prod-
ucts was not counted as "private trade" by the OEEC and, thus, not
included in the official liberalisation statistics.
B. Tariff Policy; Tearing Down Self-Erected Barriers to Trade
In the first three years after the war tariffs certainly exerted
no influence on the tiny volume and the structure of German im-
ports. Until the end of 1946 tariffs were hardly ever collected at
all in the three Western zones of occupation; and even the reen-
actment of the prewar tariff in the Anglo-American bi-zone in ear-
ly 1947 and in the French zone a few months later scarcely affect-
ed German consumers as internal prices were fixed by the Allied
Authorities anyhow. Although the introduction of a unified ex-
change rate (0.30 $/Mark) in May 1948 and the abolition of price
controls on most goods in the wake of the currency reform of June
20, 1948, did create some link between import duties and internal
prices in West Germany, these tariffs were largely irrelevant in
face of the all encompassing system of administrative import con-
trols. However, by the time tariffs actually started to play at
least a minor role for the volume and structure of imports, i.e.
after the removal of quotas on 50 % of private imports from the
OEEC countries at the end of 1949, the debate about German tariff
policy had already begun in earnest, both between competing local
lobbies and between the German authorities on the one hand and the
Allies on the other hand.
In the years 1948 to 1949, the Allies had set the stage for the
debates to come. At the first round of GATT negotiations in Gene-
va, the U.S. had succeeded in ensuring that West Germany, without
being a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, was
granted "most favoured nation" (MFN) treatment by 13 of her most
important trading partners on September 14, 1948. This was a re-
markable step. After World War I, the victors had obtained MFN
treatment from the Reich without granting a reciprocal concession- 27 -
(Moller 1981). Nevertheless, a subsequent allied decision of Au-
gust 8, 1949, that Germany was to extend MFN treatment to all
countries regardless of the beneficiaries policies towards Germany
("statement of Annecy") was considered a "unilateral servitude" by
many Germans, including liberal-minded Ludwig Erhard, the future
Minister of Economic Affairs (Erhard 1954, p. 210). The chance for
the German authorities to reshape the future structure of tariff
protection came a few months later. As a preparation for the third
round of GATT negotiations in Torquay (England) in 1950 and 1951,
the specific tariff dating back to 1902, the "Bulow-Tariff", which
had been reenacted in 1947, had to be replaced by an ad valorem
tariff specifying products according to the 1948 "Brussels nomen-
clatura". On October 11, 1949, four weeks after the foundation of
the Federal Republic, the Federal Government appointed a committee
including representatives of industrial and agricultural organisa-
tions and the trade unions to work out a new tariff schedule. In
the hearings before and the discussions within this committee rep-
resentatives of industry argued for low tariffs in general (except
for fertilizers, other chemicals, electrical products, and some
other commodities) and for a far-reaching reduction of tariffs on
agricultural products in particular in order to (i) ensure admis-
sion into the GATT to the benefit of German exports, (ii) to lower
the cost of imported raw materials, and (iii) to reduce prices for
essential goods as a means of moderating wage demands. This point
of view was largely supported by the Ministry of Economics and the
trade unions, while many conservative politicians lent an ear to
the agrarian lobby who argued for high tariffs on agricultural
goods (and low tariffs on fertilizers correspondingly) (Jerchow
1979, Lohse 1958) .
The tariff that emerged out of this debate over effective rates
of protection for different sectors of the economy was a compro-
mise biased in favour of agricultural interest. The new tariff was
expressly designed to give German negotiators in Torquay consid-
erable bargaining power and scope for reciprocal tariff reductions
(Erhard 1954) . The rates proposed by the tariff committee were in
general considerably higher than the corresponding rates in the- 28 -
old Biilow Tariff, although Germany had been invited to the Torquay
conference under the condition not to use the introduction of a
new tariff schedule to increase import duties. As a consequence,
the Allied High Commission did in fact demand substantial reduc-
tions of the proposed duties on many agricultural products, on
chemicals, fertilizers, electrical goods and some other commodit-
ies (Jerchow 1979) . However, when the German parliament turned out
to be very reluctant to yield to this pressure, the Allies dropped
most of their demands in 1951.
Meanwhile, Germany negotiated in Torquay on the basis of a pro-
posed tariff that had not yet been approved by parliament and the
Allies. In the course of these negotiations, the Germans made
"concessions" (i.e. the reduction or at least the binding of tar-
iff rates), on 32 % of her 3646 tariff positions. Still, the new
import duties finally enacted on October 1, 1951, were according
to some calculations on average three times as high as the Biilow
rates (Rittershausen 1955, Lohse-1958). The lowest tariffs were
levied on imports of raw materials and intermediate products
(Erhard 1954) while agriculture was protected most thoroughly. For
the time being Germany assumed a middle position between high
tariff-countries like the United Kingdom, France and Italy on the
one hand and low-tariff countries like Belgium, the Netherlands,
14 Sweden and Switzerland on the other hand.
In Torquay, Germany had achieved her overriding goal: admission
into the GATT (which had actually been put in jeopardy twice,
first by an initial Czech objection against the participation of
the "non-sovereign" Federal Republic, and second - and more seri-
ously - by a quarrel about German seasonal tariffs on the imports
of some vegetables from her Western neighbours). However, while
the representatives of German agriculture were content with the
Torquay results, many German industrialists and Ludwig Erhard were
somewhat disappointed. Germany had obtained fewer "concessions"
from her partners than the export oriented branches of industry
had hoped for - and had in turn reduced fewer tariffs than her
negotiators had been willing to (Ehmann 1958, Erhard 1954). The- 29 -
very fact that the Germans had previously increased tariff rates
to obtain bargaining chips helps to explain this partial failure.
Assuming that Germany would reduce these tariffs anyhow, her part-
ners at the negotiation table were reluctant to offer "conces-
sions" in exchange (Erhard 1954, p. 219). Indeed, on October 10,
1951, Germany first reduced some of her left-over bargaining tar-
iffs unilaterally.
As quantitative restrictions were gradually relaxed in the years
1952 to 1958, tariffs reassumed their role as the classical in-
strument of commercial policy, and the debate on German tariffs
remained rather vigorous, both internally and between West Germany
and her trading partners. Erhard who advocated linear tariff re-
ductions (i.e. reductions affecting all goods alike) was - on this
point - usually supported by the export industries, many social
democrats, the trade unions, and even housewives' associations
(Ehmann 1958) who demanded a farreaching reduction of agricultural
tariffs in particular. The agrarian lobby, on the other hand,
which tried to resist any changes that would not have increased
the effective protection of German agriculture, was in most cases
backed by the Ministry of Agriculture, the parliamentary committee
on agriculture, many Christian Democrats and some Free Democrats
(Tudyka 1978).
Erhard's position was strengthened by pressure from abroad, most
notably from the OEEC and the GATT, to reduce German tariffs uni-
laterally as a means to dampen the rise of Germany's export sur-
plus . As a matter of fact, most tariff reductions enacted by Ger-
many in the years 1953 to 1958 were made on a unilateral basis.
The agreements reached during the 9th and the 10th round of GATT
negotiations in 1955 and 1956 hardly went beyond a prolongation of
previous "concessions". With less American leverage to nudge their
trading partners into "concessions", the "free-rider" element in-
herent in unconditional MFN treatment became increasingly rele-
vant: every country has an incentive to abstain from serious nego-
tiations and wait for others to exchange "concessions" that are- 30 -
automatically extended to the abstaining countries without any
reciprocal "concessions".
Although external pressure on West Germany increased in line with
Germany's trade surplus, internal considerations gradually became
the prime mover in West Germany's commercial policy. With the ar-
gument that a lowering of import duties would help to ease upward
pressure on internal prices (and would reduce the balance of pay-
ments surplus that gave rise to an influx of foreign reserves)
Erhard secured a series of unilateral tariff reductions in the
years from 1954 onwards. However, Erhard did not succeed in lower-
ing all tariffs alike. Tariffs on agricultural products were most-
ly exempt from these measures (or reduced by a smaller margin than
levies on other goods). Thus, although Germany gradually turned
into a low-tariff country, the effective protection of agriculture
remained high (and may even have increased for some products due
to relatively lower tariffs on inputs).
In most respects, West Germany's tariff policy from 1951 to 1958
(the last year of the period considered) resembles that described
above for the removal of quantitative restrictions, the main dif-
ference being, however, that newly independent West Germany had
erected most of her tariff barriers herself in 1950 to 1951, while
she had inherited the system of administrative controls of trade
quantities from the Allies and the late German Reich.
V. Conclusions
After World War II Europe took the long road to currency convert-
ibility. Due to a reluctance on both sides of the Atlantic to re-
value the dollar or to devalue European currencies respectively,
the lack of international liquidity, the "dollar gap", retarded
the removal of barriers to trade and payments for more than a dec-
ade. Instead of realigning currencies sufficiently, the U.S., the
hegemonial power, and Europe simply opted to wait for Europe's
postwar needs to import from the U.S. to abate over the course of- 31 -
time before they took decisive steps to liberalise European im-
ports from the technologically most advanced area. American pres-
sure for the economic integration of Europe can, apart from its
political dimension, be seen as an attempt to hasten the change in
the regional structure of European import demand by removing
intra-European barriers to trade and payments and by integrating
West Germany into the European economy. As far as the peculiar
German experience is concerned, the Allies have to be credited
with initiating the first German steps away from wartime autarchy
after 1947. However, the four overriding imperatives dominating
West Germany's foreign economic policy after 1949, namely (1) the
integration into the Western world, (2) the promotion of exports,
(3) the maintenance of internal price level stability, and (4) the
adherence to the principle of fixed exchange rates, turned Germany
into a pacemaker for liberalisation for endogenous reasons. With
less inflation than almost everywhere in Europe, Germany started
to accumulate huge balance of trade surpluses, and the argument
that a removal of barriers to trade is good for keeping prices
stable helped the liberal-minded Minister of Economic Affairs,
Erhard, to push for liberalisation. At the same time, Germany out-
paced other countries in terms of growth of exports, output, and
productivity, while her liberalisation policy enabled her to buy
goods where these were cheapest, i.e. improved her terms of trade
(Wallich 1955). Unfortunately, West Germany's liberalisation ef-
forts were partly made ineffective by the government's willingness
to yield to pressures from the farmers' lobby for high rates of




L 1949 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958
Total Exports 198 26
Percentage share of exports
to
- EPU 60 97
. Met. OEEC 52 95
- $ area
. North America 4.1 1.5
- Others
. Eastern Europe 9.2











































Total Imports 183 71 186 225 321 383 555 618
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III. Balance of Trade with























































German Reich; Figures on Commodity Structure: Western Regions of German Reich
Bizonia;
Monthly averages in million dollars at current prices; exports f.o.b., imports c.i.f.; balance
of trade: exports minus imports
Percentage Shares
BdL figures
Sources: OEEC, Foreign Trade, Statistical Bulletin, 1950-1959; Erhard 1954; Motz 1952; Bank
deutscher Lander (BdL), Monthly Report 12/57; BdL figures differ slightly from OEEC
figures due to a stricter exclusion of transshipment in BdL-Statistics.Table 2: West Germany's foreign Trade: Volire Indices and Terms of Trade (1953 = 100)









































86 94 100 99 108
German Reich
Bizonia
CFor 1936 and 1949-54 items are weighed with 1950 and for 1956 and 1958 with their 1954 shares in totals.
d2nd half of 1949 only.
eAverage value of exports divided by average value of imports.
Calculated on the basis of volumes and average prices given in table 7 (items weighed with 1948 shares). Due to the
difference in base years between the 1947 and the other figures, to the multiplicity of exchange rates governing Bi-
zonia's trade in 1947, and to the general unreliability of the data for the early postwar period, this figure is a rough
indicator of magnitude rather than a precise number. Bizonia's terms of trade would have looked even more favourable
if her coal exports had not been priced below world market level until mid-1947.
Source: OEEC, Foreign Trade, Statistical Bulletin, 1949-1959; own calculations.
Table 3:
Percentage of Private German Imports Free from Quantitative Restrictions
Breakdown by product categories




































































Items weighed by their 1949 share in private inports from metropolitan OEEC countries
bSeptember/October 1949 share
°Iterns weighed by their 1953 share in private inports from the U.S. and Canada
{): OEEC average
Sources: Bank for International Settlements, Annual Reports 1952-1959;
European Payments Union, Annual Reports 1952-1959.
Table 4:
Percentage Shares in World Trade














































































































Sourcei ORF.C, Foroign Trade, Statistical Bulletin, Series I, 1949-1959; own calculationsTable 5s
"German Crisis*i Export and Import Values
3 1950 to mid-1951
































































































































































Monthly average in Million dollars at current prices
Source: Compiled from OEEC Foreign Trade, statistical Bulletin, 1950-1952
Table 6 :
"German Crisis": Growth Rates
a of Export and Import Values











Percentage change on corresponding month of previous year, for 1950: change on corresponding


























































































"German Crisis": Trade Volumes



























































167 199 . 241 313 307 335 360 352
101.2 109.5 131.7 142.6 83.8 68.3 49.4 12.5
0.71 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.91
238 211 268 336 302 227 272 278
59.7 6.0 38.9 33.9 26.9 7.6 1.5 -17.3
0.83 0.82 0.83 0.91 0.98 1.12 1.16 1.09
0.86 0.86 0.86 0.8 0.79 0.75 0.77 0.83















































E Previous year, for 1950 and 1951: change on corresponding quarter
''Avurugu prico of exports divided by average price of imports. Source: seo table 5- 35 -
Table 8:
Selected Measures of European Economic Integration
Exports to/imports from Metropolitan OEEC countries in per cent of all exports/imports





















































































^Metropolitan OEEC countries excluding West Germany
^Weighed by actual exports/imports of the individual countries
cStandard deviation divided by mean
dFor 1937: German .Reich
Source: OEEC, Foreign Trade, Statistical Bulletin, Series I, 1949-1959; own calculations
Table 9:



























































Cumulative balance 12/58 divided by the respective EPU quota.
C Payments figures understate the British balance of payments problems due to the inclusion
of the Sterling area in these figures.
d Devaluation of 18 % in 1953.
Source: EPU, Annual Reports 1950/51-1958; BIS, Annual Reports 1950-1959; own calculations- 36 -
Notes
In some cases bilateral deficits surpassing the "swing" were ac-
commodated by the extension of additional credits even in the ear-
ly postwar period.
Since the 1945 Potsdam Agreement on a joint administration of
Germany had miscarried due to French resistance to any measure
treating Germany as a unit, the trade monopoly of the military
government meant in fact that every occupying power had almost
complete freedom of action in her own zone. In the Western zones,
the French used this power to extract as many goods as possible
out of their slice of Germany, the British made sure that exports
of coal (and other raw materials) reached high levels while, for
protectionist reasons, they showed less enthusiasm for the promo-
tion of exports of German manufactures, and the Americans gener-
ously supplied food imports while the debate on the desired future
for Germany between late adherents of a watered-down Morgenthau
plan in Washington and pragmatists like General Clay, the Command-
er of the U.S. Forces in Germany, went on. The beginning of 1947
marked a turning point. The Joint Export and Import Agency (JEIA)
of the Anglo-American bizone (founded on January 1, 1947 at the
insistence of the U.S.) made some efforts to promote exports and
even to reduce red tape, albeit with rather limited success. The
relaxation of internal price controls in the wake of the currency
reform in June 1948 gave a first significant stimulus to private
cross-border exchanges, a development which was enhanced by the
JEIA decision to restrict its role to a mere ex post control of
private trade contracts for most products as of December 1, 1948.
Six months after the trade agency of the French zone (OFICOMEX)
had (at least on paper) been merged with JEIA in mid-April 1949,
JEIA was finally dissolved. Her functions were taken over by the
authorities of the just established Federal Repulic, although Ger-
many's commercial policy remained subject to Allied control until
her admission to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
in October 1951.
Incidentally, the Joint Export Import Agency of the Anglo-Ameri-
can bi-zone started to conclude the first minor bilateral trade
agreements on behalf of Bizonia in 1947 in order to expand the
tiny volume of German trade. However, the bilateral agreements
concluded between JEIA and 20 foreign countries in 1947 and 1948
were much too rigid to be of great practical significance (Erhard
1954, p. 85).
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The first Agreement on Multilateral Monetary Compensation con-
cluded by the Benelux countries, France and Italy on November 18,
1947, and extended to Bizonia shortly thereafter, had hardly any
significance at all. No country was obliged to participate in any
operation which would have increased her net deficit vis-a-vis any
other country. The turn-over of intra-European compensations in-
creased from October 1948 onwards when all OEEC countries except
Switzerland and Portugal were enticed to participate by a link
between the settlement of trade balances and ERP aid. Under the
two Agreements for Intra-European Payments and Compensations- 37 -
(October 1948 to June 1950) fixed amounts of this aid were ear-
marked for imports from specified European countries only. These
bilateral drawing rights were periodically determined in advance
on the basis of the expected bilateral payments positions. Deficit
countries gained from this procedure while surplus countries were,
in effect, forced to donate part of their ERP aid to their debt-
ors. Consequently, countries systematically overstated their pro-
spective bilateral deficits and even discouraged exports in some
instances. The problems were exacerbated by inadequate forecasts
of actual payments positions. Due to this biased mechanism, not
even the conversion of one-quarter of these bilateral drawing
rights into multilateral means of exchange in July 1949 sufficed
to make this system workable. All in all, no more than 4 % of the
bilateral positions which could have been settled under an effec-
tive multilateral scheme were actually cleared by the multilateral
mechanisms established in Europe under these agreements (Triffin
1957, p. 149).
To be precise: beyond an initial gold free tranche amounting to
20 per cent of the respective quota for both debtors and credi-
tors, 50 per cent of net surplusses were to be settled in gold
while countries with a net deficit had to pay gold (or dollars) on
a rising scale (EPU 1959, p. 19).
Independent of the quotas, the Economic Cooperation Agency fixed
initial balances for countries presumed to be in serious payments
imbalances in the initial period. Presumed creditors (Belgium,
United Kingdom and Sweden) were allotted initial debts totalling
$215 million, while supposedly "weak" countries (Greece, Iceland,
Netherlands, Norway and Austria) were granted initial credits to-
talling $279 million. These initial positions were not repayable.
They amounted to a donation from the Union to the latter group of
countries, while the members of the former group - having received
corresponding amounts of conditional Marshall-plan aid - were ob-
liged to donate their respective initial positions to the EPU.
On October 30, 1949 West Germany unilaterally abolished quotas on
37.4 % of private imports from OEEC countries (base period: first
half of 1949) . Furthermore, bilateral trade agreements with Swit-
zerland (27.8.1949), the Netherlands (7.9.1949), Norway
(19.9.1949), Austria (30.9.1949), Belgium-Luxembourg (16.11.1949),
Denmark (24.11.1949), and Sweden (26.11.1949) provided for the
removal of most quantitative restrictions on German imports from
these countries, subject only to a global quota in the case of
Switzerland and the Netherlands (Bundesanzeiger 3.11.1949;
Brzosniowsky 1950). In the subsequent negotiations with the OEEC,
West Germany took the stance that she had thus already fulfilled
her obligation to remove 50 % of quantitative restrictions vis-a-
vis OEEC members by December 15, 1949, a claim which was valid if
only the second half of 1949 and not the entire year was taken as
the base period for the calculation of the share in liberalised
imports. However, this debate became obsolete in early 1950 by the
liberalisation of imports from France (trade agreement of
10.2.1950), the revision of the German "free list" (30.4.1950) and- 38 -
by the fact that most other OEEC countries were even further be-
hind their Liberalisation schedule than Germany.
Incidentally, this pronounced pro-cyclical behaviour of European
imports ma-, - to some extent - be due to the belated effects of
import restrictions enacted by debtor countries at the peak of
booms.
9The following facts may further illustrate this point: In 1958,
the final year considered in this paper, exports of goods and ser-
vices amounted to 25 % of West Germany's GNP as compared to 8 % in
1949, while imports of goods and services went up from 11 % of GNP
in 1949 to 21 % in 1958 (BIS 1959, p. 37). The growth of the ex-
ternal sector was much more pronounced in Germany than in France
and the U.K., two industrial countries of comparable size (U.K.:
ratio of visible and invisible exports to GNP: 20 % in 1949, 23 %
in 1958; corresponding import ratios: 20 % in 1949, 20 % in 1958;
France: ratio of visible and invisible exports to GNP: 9 % in
1949, 15 % in 1958; corresponding import ratios: 14 % in 1949,
16 % in 1958 (BIS 1959, p. 37)).
Even Ludwig Erhard who turned into an advocate of flexible ex-
change rates in the early 1950s (Erhard 1953, p. 133; Erhard 1954,
p. 83; Deutsche Zeitung, 18.10.1952) did not press this point in
the international policy debate.
Initially, the Allies fixed the dollar exchange rate at $ 0.10
per Reichsmark for purchases of the Armed Forces ("Militarmark"),
while the minimal volumes of cross-border trade were governed by a
chaotic multiplicity of product-specific exchange rates supposed
to equate the fixed internal price of a product to the correspond-
ing price on the world market ($ 0.24 - 0.80 per Reichsmark). As a
corollary to the currency reform and the relaxation of internal
price controls in June 1948, the exchange rate was (almost com-
pletely) unified and fixed at $ 0.30 per Reichsmark in May 1948.
This rate was at that time justified by Erhard as a means to ex-
pose German industry to severe competitive pressure from abroad
(Erhard 1954), but it was deemed far too high by his advisory
council (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 1949) .
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The 10 % foreign exchange bonus was split evenly between imports
of inputs (bonus A) and imports of goods to be distributed to the
workers (bonus B). Bonus B expired in July 1948, bonus A in Febru-
ary 1949 (Motz 1954) .
The dollar parity remained fixed at 4.20 Marks per dollar
throughout the '50s except for some experiments with retention
quotas for foreign exchange proceeds which amounted to multiple
exchange rate practices. The most striking example is the 40 %
dollar quota initiated in 1952. This scheme allowed exporters to
sell 40 % of their dollar proceeds to importers of certain goods
at a negotiable price. The practical usefulness of this dollar
quota was diminished by severe restrictions on the list of permis-
sible imports. It was abandoned in May 1953 in compliance with a- 39 -
request from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Wallich 1955,
p. 250) .
14
The new German tariff immediately invoked heavy criticism from
Switzerland whose government had not participated in the GATT
talks. Swiss threats to discriminate against German exports in-
duced a series of negotiations. In the end, Germany made consider-
able "concessions" which affected 165 out of her 3646 tariff posi-
tions (Lohse 1958).
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